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Foreword
by Peter F. Krogh
Dean, School of Foreign Service
The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy seeks to improve today's skills
for the practice of tomorrow's diplomacy by the examination of case studies
of the diplomatic process. All of the Institute's publications so far have dealt
with relatively recent diplomatic transactions occurring within the author's
lifetime. Why then the publication of a dissertation on diplomatic dealings
over a century ago?
The relevance of Sister Dougherty's thesis to our concerns stems from the
duties of diplomats which she discusses and which, upon examination,
appear to have been not very different during the Franco-Prussian war from
what they are today: Political reporting, analysis, judicious forecasting,
policy recommendation, protection of American citizens, trade promotion,
consular duties, representation and protection of foreign nationals as "pro
tecting power". All these factors are present (not necessarily in terms of
performance, but in terms of the requirement for them) in this analysis of the
work of the American ministers in Paris and Berlin during the Franco-
Prussian war.
The story is instructive not so much because of the excellence of the
performance of those American representatives but because it is easier,
perhaps, to see deficiencies in their appointment and in their performance
when they are viewed in a larger perspective. The two ministers, as Sister
Dougherty points out in her conclusions, "served Washington inadequately
in very different ways." There are things to be learned from those in
adequacies.
Both American ministers were appointed because of political debts owed
to them by Presidents. Elihu B. Washburne had been Secretary of State
(for five days) but had proved unsuited to that task because of a lack of
stamina, tact and flexibility. He was sent to Paris instead, perhaps in the
belief that those deficiencies didn't matter there. Known in the Congress as
the "Watchdog of the Treasury" because of his penny-pinching, he did not
telegraph his most timely dispatches about the war but sent them by boat
instead. He was a fierce defender of certain American rights. If he was guilty
of errors, they were errors more of omission than of commission.
By contrast, George Bancroft, the American minister to Prussia, not only
had previous diplomatic experience but also was believed eminently suited
for his post by virtue of having studied in Germany and being the author of a
monumental work of history which earned him immediate entree to the
highest social and intellectual circles in Berlin. His trouble was that he could
see no wrong in his host country. Instead, he became an eager defender of its
every action—a phenomenon known today as "localitis" or "clientitis" and
bemoaned in some American ambassadors who, the complaint goes, behave
more like the ambassadors lo the United States of their host countries than
as ambassadors o/the United States to those countries.
There is much to be learned by analogy from this unpretentious study.
How transient, for instance, are ideological grounds for sympathy with
foreign countries, and how frail is ideology as a basis for the determination
of national interest! When the Franco-Prussian war began, the American
diplomatic establishment tended to sympathize with Prussia, which was
seeking to unify Germany (along federal lines patterned, it was thought, after
the model of the United States) and to desire the defeat of France, then
deemed by some to be a decadent and imperial power. Within half a year,
France was a republic and Germany an empire, with the perceived danger of
expansiveness shifting from one to the other.
The study of "Perceptions from Paris and Berlin" can be read on several
levels—as a lesson from the past, as an analysis of diplomatic performance,
as a reminder of the permanence of certain problems and requirements of
diplomacy, as a cautionary tale, as a contribution to the study of European
history and American diplomacy of the period, and also as sheer entertain
ment. I insist on the last element, which should not be regarded as in any way
derogatory. If we can learn while being entertained, so much the better for
us.
In this soberly written disquisition, the reader will find traces of the
human condition with all its vulnerability and pathos—as for instance in
the story of the fierce defense of the right of the American minister in Paris
to receive mail, including newspapers, during the siege of that city, a right
that he safeguarded but then abandoned because, to that sobersided
American, it was "/oo much to be the only person in a city of two millions of
people receiving any outside news.'''' Or the story of how the American
minister in Berlin, upon receiving unwelcome instructions to deliver a pro
test, managed to execute them as perfunctorily as possible—presumably
because he thought the host country was unjustly criticized and also because
his "good relations" with the host government appeared to him more im
portant than reflecting accurately the views and temper of his own govern
ment.
The School of Foreign Service owes a debt of gratitude to two professors of
the Department of History of Georgetown University: the late Dagmar
Horna-Perman who initially sponsored and influenced the subject and outline
of this study, and Thomas T. Helde who directed the study after the death of
Dr. Horna-Perman and molded it into a form that makes the relevance of its
lessons to contemporary diplomacy more apparent. This publication
represents a first attempt of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy to reach
out and avail itself of the richness of resources in other departments of
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Georgetown University which, in their own way, also have lessons to
contribute about the conduct of diplomacy.
Thank you. Sister Patricia Dougherty, for having provided us with a study
that, across a gulf of over a hundred years, puts to us pointed lessons about
the "conduct and misconduct of foreign affairs," old lessons which speak to
us with fresh relevance. You have made a contribution to the study of
diplomacy which would perhaps be more difficult to assimilate if it related to
a more recent conflict. And thank you. Professor Thomas T. Helde, for
having shepherded this study through various stages of production to the
point where it is a most fitting "case study" for the Institute's program of
studies of diplomacy.
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In July 1870, war between Prussia and France erupted over the candida
ture of a German prince to the Spanish throne, with far-reaching con
sequences for the balance of power in Europe. Six weeks later, the German
army decisively defeated the French at Sedan and captured the French
emperor. Napoleon III. Although this victory precipitated the collapse of the
Second French Empire, it did not end the war. Only after a four-month siege
of Paris did the French surrender to the Germans on January 28, 1871.
Between this date and the signing of the peace treaty at Frankfurt on May
10, both France and Germany underwent far-reaching changes in their
governmental structure: the war and its aftermath created the Third French
Republic and the Second German Reich.
The outbreak of the war has been attributed to the machinations of Otto
von Bismarck, Prussian chancellor, who wished to create a united Germany
under Prussian hegemony.' He was a careful and clever man, a consummate
tactician who used events as they occurred according to how he saw them fit
into his plan. The proximate cause of the Franco-Prussian War, the publica
tion of the edited "Ems telegram" in July, 1870, is an example of his well-
calculated action.
The events which led to the "Ems telegram" began in early 1870, when
Bismarck encouraged the candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-
Sigmaringen to the Spanish throne—vacant since the Spanish revolution in
1868.2 Although Leopold had already twice refused, he accepted a renewed
Spanish offer in June, 1870. At that time. King Wilhelm of Prussia, as head
of the House of Hohenzollern, approved the candidacy.
What Bismarck intended in promoting the candidacy is a matter of
historical debate. He must have recognized that a Spanish government
sympathetic to Germany would be a military asset. In the event of war, the
French would have to protect the Spanish frontier, and thus one to two of
their army corps could not be employed against Germany. Further, Bis
marck knew that Napoleon III would object to a German prince on the
'The events leading to the declaration of war are examined in the following works:
Georges Bonnin, ed., Bismarck and the Hohenzollern Candidature for the Spanish
Throne: The Documents in the German Diplomatic Archives, trans. Isabella M.
Massey (London: Chatto & Windus, 1957); Robert Howard Lord, The Origins of the
War of 1870: New Documents from the German Archives (1924; reprint ed.. New
York: Russell & Russell, 1966); Lawrence D. Steefel, Bismarck, the Hohenzollern
Candidacy and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1962).
^Bismarck to King of Prussia, March 9, 1870, Bonnin, pp. 68-73.
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Spanish throne. He felt that this objection would further his aim, the
unification of Germany, because a bellicose France would encourage the
southern German states to align themselves with the North German Con
federation led by Prussia. (Austria had been knocked out of a role in
German politics in 1866, when it had been defeated by Prussia.) Possibly
Bismarck hoped for war with France. His memoirs provide evidence that he
felt such a war to be inevitable, but these were written more than twenty
years after the event. He wrote:
1 took it as assured that war with France would necessarily have to be
waged on the road to our further national development, for our
development at home as well as the extension beyond the Main, and
that we must keep this eventuality in sight in all our domestic as well as
in our foreign relations.^
For more than a week following the news of Leopold's acceptance there
was the possibility of war. The French protested the candidacy and sent
Count Vincent Benedetti, the French Ambassador in Berlin, to Ems to
induce the King of Prussia—there taking the waters—to secure the with
drawal of Leopold's acceptance. Since Prince Leopold, on an Alpine ex
cursion, was unaware of the crisis and could not be reached. Prince Karl
Anton informed King Wilhelm of July 12 that he renounced the Spanish
throne on behalf of his son. King Wilhelm, a peaceful man, received this news
joyfully and told Benedetti that the answer from the Sigmaringens would
officially reach him on the morning of July 13. Bismarck was disappointed
when all seemed to be settled amicably. His concern was always for Prussia's
prestige, and he worried about what effect the Prussian retreat would have on
the south German states whom he wished to include in a united Germany.
Napoleon III and his Foreign Minister Antoine Due de Gramont were not
fully content with the Prussian retreat and instructed Ambassador Benedetti
to secure a promise that there would be no future candidacy of the Hohen-
zollern prince. The question of the candidature had become secondary to the
broader point of obtaining "satisfaction" from Prussia.
At Ems, Benedetti thrice pressed the demand for a future commitment on
the part of King Wilhelm. The King politely refused and informed Benedetti
that because the withdrawal of Leopold from the Spanish candidacy had been
secured, he felt the problem was over and there was no need for further
discussion on this topic. Heinrich Abeken, who was staying at Ems as the
liaison between the king and the North German foreign office in Berlin,
drafted and sent a report of the conversations that had taken place between
the Prussian king and the French ambassador. This became the famous Ems
^Otto von Bismarck, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman, 2 vols. (New York:
Harper & Bro., 1899), 11:57.
dispatch of July 13, 1870. Bismarck edited it so that both Benedetti and the
King appeared to have been treated discourteously: Count Benedetti because
of the king's refusal to talk with the French ambassador and King Wilhelm
because of the "impertinent" demand for future guarantees. It was important
for Bismarck that Prussia be viewed as the victim of an overbearing France in
order to be sure that the south German states would honor their military
treaties with the North German Confederation, which provided that the
forces of these states would come under the command of the Prussian army
in the event of a "German" war.
In France a furor followed the publication of the doctored telegram. On
July 14, the French cabinet and Emperor Napoleon III decided to prepare
for war to avenge their honor. On July 15, the Corps Legislatif enthu
siastically voted war credits. The French mobilized their forces, and later
that day the North German Confederation mobilized. On the 16th, the south
German states mobilized. And on July 19, the French charge d'affaires in
Berlin, Georges Le Sourd, delivered the declaration of war to Bismarck.
Although historians have studied the Franco-Prussian War from the
viewpoint of its military consequences, of its importance in the national
histories of France and Germany, and of its significance in the shifting
balance of power in European history, little has been written about how
contemporary non-participants perceived the war and its issues. This paper
focuses on perceptions of the Franco-Prussian War by the American diplo
matic establishment: who was seen as responsible for the war; how Bis
marck's aims for German unification were interpreted; and how the American
ministers to the belligerents sought to implement American neutrality. An
exploration of these perceptions sheds light on the American diplomatic
system of the time and on Bismarck's negotiating skill with respect to the
neutrals. The primary focus of this study is on the American minister in
Paris, Elihu Benjamin Washburne, and the American minister in Berlin,
George Bancroft, with additional insights from other Americans assigned to
the diplomatic missions.
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1« Respomibility For War:
Reports (And Lack Thereof) From Paris
The swift outbreak of hostilities between Prussia and France suddenly
dominated what had begun as a peaceful summer. Of the major figures in this
study, only the United States minister to the Prussian court was at his post in
Berlin. Bismarck was at Varzin, his remote estate in Pomerania; the Prussian
king was still taking the waters at Ems; his wife was at Coblenz; and
Benedetti, the French Ambassador to Prussia, was at Wildbad. The Ameri
can minister to France was enjoying the pleasures of Carlsbad.
Elihu Benjamin Washburne had been appointed by President Grant to the
post of American Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to
France in March, 1869. During the Civil War, Washburn as a congressman
had recommended that Grant be commissioned first a colonel and later a
brigadier general of the Illinois volunteers. When Grant became President,
he reciprocated with the gratifying appointment of Washburne as Secretary
of State. This appointment turned out to be unsuitable, however, because of
Washburne's frail health and because of his temperament. The office of
Secretary of State required stamina, tact, and flexibility, all of which Wash
burne lacked. Washburne experienced frequent bouts of illness and could be
belligerent and stubborn.' After only five days, Washburne resigned his
cabinet post and accepted the responsibilities of Minister to France, which
post he held until the autumn of 1877.2
Born in Maine in 1816, Washburne was the third of eleven children of a
family which encouraged public service. Four of the eight sons served in
Congress; two became diplomats, Elihu in France and Charles in Paraguay;
and two were state governors. After attending Harvard Law School, Wash-
' According to Russell Nelson, Washburne tended to exaggerate his suffering and
enjoyed complaining about his maladies. This is probably true, for he survived
remarkably well both the long hours of work and strain in trying to protect the
citizens of the North German Confederation and the rigors of living through the siege
in Paris with its accompanying scarcity of food and fuel. Russell K. Nelson, "The
Early Life and Congressional Career of Elihu B. Washburne" (Ph.D. dissertation.
University of North Dakota, 1953), p. 516. According to Samuel Flagg Bemis, an
example of Washburne's unsuitable temperament was his persistent advocacy of
President Johnson's impeachment. That Washburne was not cowed by anyone will
be seen later in his dealing with Bismarck. Samuel Flagg Bemis, ed.. The American
Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy (1928): reprint ed.. New York: Pageant
Book Company, 1958, Vol. 7-8: 120-1.
^Francis Xavier Gannon, "A Study of Elihu Benjamin Washburne: American Minis
ter to France during the Franco-Prussian War and the Commune" (Ph.D. disser
tation, Georgetown University, 1950), pp. 13-34.
1
burne opened a law office in Galena, Illinois. Twelve years later (1852), he
won his first election to Congress and remained there for sixteen years as a
Radical Whig, earning a reputation for being an opponent of spenders and
schemers and receiving the nickname "Watchdog of the Treasury."
Serving in France he continued the struggle against spenders and schemers.
In the summer of 1860, he alerted Frenchmen to the fact that the American
government was not backing the Memphis and El Paso Railroad bonds, as
the advertisements claimed. Thus, Washburne helped protect American pres
tige when the railroad went bankrupt in 1870.
The traits that made Washburne "Watchdog of the Treasury" also carried
over into his attitude toward expenditures in the Paris legation. In one of his
first dispatches to the State Department after the outbreak of war, he
expressed his concern about the expense of telegraphic communications and
requested guidelines on when he should use this fast method of communica-
tion.3 Later during the war, he fretted about the increased expenses of the
legation due to the amount of work required to protect the citizens of the
North German Confederation.
In early summer 1870, although Franco-Prussian relations had recently
been cool, Washburne felt no special alarm about developments. After all
on June 30 Premier Emile Ollivier had told the Chamber of Deputies: "At no
period has the maintenance of peace seemed better assured."'* Having been
granted a leave of absence, Washburne left on July 2 for his vacation in
Carlsbad where he hoped to spend six or seven weeks. Colonel Wickham
Hoffman remained as charge' d'affaires in Paris.
Hoffman, born in New York City in 1821, was a lawyer and an army
officer and had only recently become a diplomat. He had graduated from
Harvard in 1841 and had set up a legal practice in New York. After his
military service during the Civil War on the staff of several different generals,
he was appointed to the post of assistant secretary of the American Legation
at Paris. In the following year, he was promoted to first secretary and
remained in that capacity until 1874, when he took the corresponding job in
London.
It was Hoffman who alerted Washburne and Secretary of State Hamilton
Fish that a crisis was developing in Paris over the news of Prince Leopold's
acceptance of the Spanish throne. Hoffman described the furor that arose
over a possible Hohenzollern in Spain. "The journals of all shades are
^The transatlantic cable connected Europe and America in 1867. Count Otto zu
Stolberg-Wernigerode, Germany and the United States of America during the Era
of Bismarck, trans. Otto E. Lessing (Reading, Pennsylvania: Henry Janssen Founda
tion, 1937), p. 109.
"Ollivier quoted in Michael Eliot Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German
Invasion of France. 1870-1871 (1960; reprint ed., London: Fontana Library 1967),
p. 48.
unanimous that such an insult and peril to France cannot be tolerated." He
reported that the government journals blamed Bismarck, who hated France
and desired a unified Germany under Prussian hegemony. Hoffman analyzed
the negative influence of Bismarck on the French in a colorful manner: "He
[Bismarck] has but to shake a red flag in their faces, and they lower their
heads, shut their eyes, and rush furiously at it."5 Hoffman explained why
France would react in such a manner. France had suffered frustration at the
hands of Germany. In 1866, Prussia's war against Austria had surprised
France and was perceived as a challenge to French supremacy in Europe.
Further, Bismarck had successfully negotiated secret treaties with the
southern states of Germany. Hoffman asserted that these previous blows to
French prestige had embittered Emperor Napoleon III. Though stating that
he feared for the peace of Europe. Hoffman evidently did not perceive the
full significance of the crisis. Due to the policy of cost-consciousness set by
the Minister, this dispatch dated July 8 was sent through regular mail and
did not arrive in the State Department until July 21, two days after war was
declared.
The situation changed, however, within a week. Hoffman became more
alarmed with the events in Europe because of the publication of the Ems
telegram. On July 14, he wrote that there was "less chance for the preserva
tion of peace in Europe than . . . a week ago."^ But he still relied on the
regular mail to communicate with the State Department. Hoffman, who had
acquired some experience in diplomacy and had been in Paris for four years,
was an astute observer and recognized the importance of the Ems telegram
as the determining factor for the French decision to declare war. However,
his report did not reach Washington in time to be of any help to the U.S.
Government in assessing the situation. (It arrived by the same mail as the
dispatch of July 18). In addition, Washburne's own observations and reports
when he returned from Carlsbad on the evening of July 18 disagreed with
Hoffman's assessment. Washburne dismissed the accuracy of the Ems tele
gram because it had been challenged by King Wilhelm. "There is no truth in
the reports concerning the indignity which the King of the North German
Confederation offered to Benedetti, the Envoy of France."' Washburn based
this statement on a published denial by the King which he had read in
Cologne while returning to Paris. Though he questioned the veracity of the
Ems telegram, Washburne still credited it with arousing the French Cham
ber of Deputies to vote for war.
^Hoffman to Fish, July 8, 1870, #217, U.S., Department of State, Despatches from
U.S. Ministers to France, Microcopy M 34, Roll 70. Hereafter cited as Despatches -
France.
^Hoffman to Fish, July 14, 1870, #220, ibid.
^Washburne to Fish, July 19, 1870, #225, ibid.
Washburne then became almost entirely engrossed in the problem of
protecting the citizens of the North German Confederation, of which there
were about thirty thousand in Paris alone. Before the actual declaration of
war, the German charge d'affaires had approached Hoffman and requested
American protection for the subjects of the Confederation. Hoffman tele
graphed the State Department on July 15, "War is certain. Can I take
Prussian subjects in France under our protection?"^ Fish authorized this
protection provided that France made no objections. France consented.
Helping Washburne in the role of protector of the citizens of the North
German Confederation was the United States Consul General in Paris, John
Meredith Read, Jr. A lawyer from Pennsylvania who had only recently
become a diplomat, Read was the son of a prominent Philadelphia jurist
who had served on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for fifteen years.
During the early months of the Civil War, he directed the military efforts of
New York State. Having supported Grant in 1868, he received the post of
consul general at Paris on April 16, 1869.
In Read's official reports to the State Department, there are few analytical
comments on the cause of the war between France and Prussia. Like
Washburne, he was more concerned with practical matters, especially since
he was responsible for protecting the business interests of the North German
Confederation from July, 1870, through December, 1871. Read left the
political comment to Washburne, and rightly so since the office of consul
dealt primarily with commerce, trade and business concerns.
After obtaining the assent of the French to American protection of the
North German citizens, Washburne again contacted French authorities to
ascertain the procedure to follow in enabling the Germans to return home It
was then that a complication arose because the Due de Gramont, the French
Foreign Minister, replied that no Germans of military age would be allowed
to leave France.
Washburne attacked this argument from a legal standpoint, citing inter
national law and precedent. On July 25, 1870, in a letter to Gramont he
professed surprise "that a liability to perform military service in the home
army constitutes a sufficient reason for the refusal of the ordinary privilege
of quitting foreign belligerent territory," noting that a male of any age or
condition under certain circumstances might be called upon to bear arms
He continued:
Even in feudal times, when the liability to do military duty to the
sovereign lord or king was held in much greater strictness than at the
present day I do not find that the point was insisted upon of the
8Hoffman to Fish, July 15, 1870 (telegram). Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States. 7570 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1870), p 64
Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations, 1870.
returning liege being liable to become a hostile soldier. . . . The same
principle [the right to leave belligerent territory after the outbreak of
hostilities] is incorporated into various subsisting treaties of the United
States, and . . . the highest American authority on public law, Chan
cellor Kent, considers the principle to have become an established
formula of modern public law.'
Gramont wrote back on August 3, 1870, that what "one law has done under
certain circumstances, another law can modify, if there is an occasion,"'®
making light of Kent as a legal authority. But after this exchange the French
government changed its mind under the pressure of war events and informed
Washburne that virtually all Germans would have to leave Paris. Washbume
telegraphed Fish; "French government decides North Germans, with certain
exceptions, quit France.""
Subsequently Washburne was so busy issuing papers to the Germans that
he found no time for diplomatic reporting and analysis. "One morning," he
reported, "on reaching my legation, at seven o'clock, I found it surrounded
by several thousand Germans in the street adjoining."'^ Washburne, along
with J. Conrad Kern, the Swiss Minister and protector of the subjects of
Bavaria and Baden, and Okouneff, the Russian charg^ d'affaires and pro
tector of the subjects of Wiirttemberg, met with the French Minister of
Interior, L^on-The'ophile Chevreau, to discuss the expulsion, which
Chevreau said was partly due to the need to protect the Germans from the
excited Parisians. Washburne felt that the Minister would do all he could to
help the three protecting foreign representatives and that the time for legal
sparring was over. From then on, he relied on human compassion to
strengthen his pleas. On August 17, he wrote to Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne,
the Minister of Foreign Affiars, who had replaced Gramont after the down
fall of the Ollivier ministry:
The removal of such a population in a few days, even with all ameliora
tions, could not fail to carry with it an incredible amount of suffering
and misery, involving, as it must the breaking up of homes and the
sacrifice and abandonment of property. . . . From my observation,
the great number [of Germans] seem to be composed . . . of honest,
industrious, laboring men and women, who have come into the country
under the sanction of public faith, relying upon the hospitality and
protection of the government. . . . The scenes I am compelled to daily
witness are afflicting. . .. I feel that I should be forgetful of the
^Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 82.
"Ibid., p. 95. Also quoted in Recollections, 1:48.
Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 92.
'^Recollections, 1:81.
obligations of humanity did I not make the strongest appeal to the
government of His Majesty, through Your Excellency, to futher con
sider this question. • 3
The Secretary of State does not seem to have missed political reports or
analyses from the Minister in Paris even though, as we shall see, the
American Minister in Berlin was a copious reporter. In his memoirs, in
accounting for his time, Washburne wrote that by September 2, 1870:
I had viseed and given safe-conducts for nearly thirty thousand per
sons, subjects of the North German Confederation . . . 1 had given
railroad tickets to the Prussian frontier for eight thousand of those
people. . . My time was then a good deal occupied in looking up
Germans who had been arrested and thrown into prison . . . when one
of these [persons arbitrarily arrested] could get word to me of his
imprisonment I never failed, in a single instance, in getting the party
promptly released.'^
The special appropriations Washburne needed to help the German subjects
had been provided in the middle of August by the Prussian government.
Because of his preoccupation with the task of protection of subjects of the
North German Confederation and because Washburne normally was given
more to reporting on the French political developments than on foreign
policy, he did not assess or comment on blame for the war in his official
communications with the State Department at that time. In his memoirs
written in 1886, he blamed the French government for the outbreak of the
war:
The exaggeration in Paris and France of this simple incident
[Benedetti's interview with William] surpassed all bounds, and they
were apparently made to inflame the people still more. It really ap
peared that the Government of France had determined to have war
with Germany,. .. the courtiers and adventurers who surrounded the
Emperor seemed to think that it was about time to have a war,. . . to
fix firmly on the throne the son of Napoleon the Third and restore to
the Imperial crown the lustre it had lost.''
But Washburne did not, even then, include Napoleon III when blaming the
government. Washburne had had good relations with the Emperor since his
arrival at the American legation in Paris, and he retained his high opinion of
Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 104. Also quoted in Recollections, 1:91,
'*Ibid., p. 96.
'sjbid, pp. 33-34.
Napoleon III as "intelligent and thoughtful and a good judge of men.'^ He
wrote:
It seemed to be very clear to my mind that if the Emperor had been left
to himself, war would have been averted. I am quite sure that his heart
was never in the venture. He had just entered upon his scheme of a
parliamentary government, and everything promised a substantial suc
cess. I think he was sincere in his wish to introduce certain real reforms
into his government."
Like Washburne, Hoffman in his memoirs did not blame Napoleon III for
deciding to declare war. At the time of the crisis, however, he interpreted the
conflict as a personal feud. In a dispatch on July 8, he noted that the rise of
Bismarck was a challenge to Napoleon III whose "policy has been thwarted
by Bismarck in more than one instance." Further, Hoffman stated: "And it
will not be surprising if this bitterness—this personal rivalry between these
distinguished statesmen—should prove disastrous to the peace of Europe."'®
The State Department received late and, at times, conflicting reports
about the development of the July crisis. For example, on July 14, Hoffman
sent two telegrams to Washington. In the first, he reported that chances were
against war; in the second, he said that chances were strong for war. In a
third telegram on July IS, he declared that war was certain. As to the actual
responsibility for the war, little space was given in reports from Paris in July
to an assessment—partly because of the confusing situation and partly
because Washburne was away from Paris during the crisis itself. However,
even if Washburne had been present, it is doubtful that he would have
written insightful commentaries on what was happening. Washburne's
character was more attuned to practical realities than to conceptualizing and
prognostication. Once the war had begun, Washburne, Hoffman, and Read
found no time for analyzing events because they devoted all their time and
energy in trying to protect the citizens and property of the North German
Confederation.
'^Ibid., p. 34.
'^Ibid.
'^Despatches - France, #217.

IL Responsibility For War:
Reports From Berlin
President Andrew Johnson appointed George Bancroft as American Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Berlin in May, 1867. Bancroft
remained at this post seven years until June, 1874. For Bancroft this was a
happy assignment because he loved Germany where he had studied as a
young man.
Pleasant memories had remained with him for half a century of Got-
tingen and the Prussian capital; he had an excellent knowledge of the
language, a familiarity with German manners and customs, a nature
well fitted to understand the Prussian character, and a reputation that
assured his instant acceptance into the inner circle of intellectual,
social, and political life.'
Born in Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1800, Bancroft was the eighth of
thirteen children. He grew up in a home where liberalism and freedom of
inquiry were respected and fostered. His father, Aaron Bancroft, a minister
of the Second Congregational Society of Worcester, advocated religious
liberalism there thirty years before it became fashionable.
After graduating from Harvard, Bancroft determined to continue his
studies as a divinity student. John Thornton Kirkland, president of Harvard,
provided a monetary subsidy to enable him to attend Georg August Uni
versity at GOttingen. In September, 1820, after two years of study, Bancroft
received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and Master of Arts. After
leaving Gottingen, Bancroft then attended lectures for five months at the
University of Berlin. It was during this time that he fell in love with Berlin—a
possible liability for a diplomat whose judgments should not be clouded by
sentiment.
After leaving Berlin in February, 1821, Bancroft traveled to Paris, Lon
don, Geneva, and Rome. Along the way he visited various scholars, writers,
and other prominent artists and intellectuals. In Paris he dined with
Washington Irving, Benjamin Constant, General Lafayette, and Albert
Gallatin. Upon his return to the United States in August, 1822, Bancroft
entered the educational profession, first teaching at Harvard and then estab
lishing Round Hill School in Northampton, Massachusetts. He began a
'Russel B. Nye, George Bancroft: Brahmin Rebel (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945),
p. 239.
political career in the 1830s by supporting Andrew Jackson's position on
the banks.2 In 1838, Bancroft became the Collector of Customs for the Port
of Boston and the leader of the Democratic party in Massachusetts. His
prominence rose in strongly Whig Boston, even though he was a Democrat.
After his defeat in the 1844 Massachusetts gubernatorial election, Bancroft
became involved in national politics. In return for Bancroft's support in the
presidential campaign of 1844, James K. Polk appointed Bancroft to his
cabinet. As Secretary of the Navy, Bancroft established the Naval Academy
at Annapolis in 1845—copying the Prussian example of education for
military personnel. From 1846 through 1849 he served as American minister
to London.3 He thus had considerably more diplomatic experience than
his colleague in Paris.
From 1849 to 1867, Bancroft worked on his History and produced six
volumes.'* Bancroft's interpretation of history emphasized nationalism; "To
Bancroft American history was a heroic epic, an exultation over American
achievement, a credo of faith in eternal national progress. The German
influence on his Weltanschauung was strong. Traces can be seen of Hegel's
nationalistic philosophy of history which "saw the past as a record of the
desire for freedom in the human spirit," of Eichhorn's work on the German
national spirit, and of Herder, Schlegel, and Schelling who had developed a
philosophy of history from the theory of progress.^
From the beginning of his service as United States Minister to Prussia, •
Bancroft enjoyed a privileged position. He was regarded as a noted his
torian—a prestigious profession—and as a social and diplomatic asset to
Berlin society. In addition, Bismarck treated him with deference. Bismarck
broke court precedent in 1867 when he took Bancroft for an audience with
the king before the king had issued an invitation. Bismarck dined with the
Bancrofts even when he had refused other invitations. Furthermore,
Bancroft was the only foreign diplomat whom Bismarck invited to his
Varzin estate.
Bismarck was also interested in fostering good relations with the United
States, and so he was pleased with Bancroft as American representative.
Bismarck wanted America's moral support for (and possibly maritime
^During this decade, Bancroft began his first volume of The History of the United
States from the Discovery of the Continent.
^Although he "had little love for the British people and less sympathy for British
politicians," Bancroft grew to like his post because of the cultured society in which he
moved. Nye, Bancroft, p. 160.
"Bancroft had written three volumes prior to his mission to England.
Uesse Hauk Shera, Historians, Books and Libraries (Cleveland: Press of Western
Reserve University, 1953), p. 67.
*Nye, Bancroft, p. 96.
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defense of) the unification of Germany.' He worked with Bancroft to settle
outstanding problems between the two countries. In 1867, the major dif
ference between Prussia and the United States concerned the Prussian
insistence that naturalized American citizens of German birth were still
liable for military service in Prussia. Bancroft began negotiations very soon
after his arrival in Berlin and successfully concluded a naturalization treaty
in February, 1868. This contributed to furthering friendly relations between
the two countries. When Grant was elected President in 1868 and there was a
rumor that Bancroft would be replaced, Bismarck made efforts to ensure
that Bancroft would stay in Berlin.
Bancroft had a high opinion of Bismarck. To him, the Chancellor was a
towering statesman, "a very human person, 'moderate in the hour success,'
and fearlessly pursuing his policies without a thought of any personal
advantage. Bancroft felt that Bismarck was a fellow believer in liberal
principles and admired his ability in unifying Germany, which he saw as the
natural outcome of "the progress of man." As many others at the time,
Bancroft misread Bismarck. For example, he wrote optimistically about
Bismarck's arrival in Berlin during the height of the July crisis:
His coming is friendly to peace, for among his qualities as a statesman
he has to an eminent degree the quality of moderation.'
This basic misunderstanding of Bismarck led Bancroft to conclude that
Bismarck could never have desired or sought a war with France.
Bancroft's bias toward Prussia was evident in his official dispatches and
private letters about the Franco-Prussian War. He described the conflict in
terms of good (Germany) and evil (France). He applauded the cause for
which Prussia fought and viewed the conflict as necessary for the progress of
history. He wrote: ". . . all Germany unites as one man in the war, which is
held to be a war for peace, independence and national existence."'"
'Henry Blumenthal, "George Bancroft in Berlin: 1867-1874," New England
Quarterly 37 (June 1964): 228-9. "As the leader of a land of power, Bismarck rather
wishfully hoped to be able to count on the naval resources of the United States,
should the future need for them arise. His inquiry in this regard just prior to the
outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War leaves no doubt about this long-range specu
lation. On July 12, 1870, he instructed Secretary of State von Thile to determine
whether in case of war the United States would grant Germany 'the means of
maritime defense.' He had specifically in mind to fit out ships in American ports for the
purpose of harassing French merchantmen on the high seas."
sibid., p. 227.
'#110, U.S., Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Ministers to the German
States and Germany, Roll 16, Microcopy M44, Hereafter cited as Despatches -
Germany.
"#116, ibid.
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Regarding the possibility of war, Bancroft reported on July 14 that,
although he personally thought that war would be avoided, the prevailing
opinion was that war was imminent. He presented both sides of the ques
tions so that Washington could make up its own mind about whether France
would declare war.
In weighing the grounds that may sway the decision of the Emperor, it
must be considered, on the one side, that France is isolated, without an
ally; that Spain must be against her; that the question of the occu
pation of Rome would again become embarrassing; that all the powers
of Europe counsel France against war; that Germany is united, and as
a land power is fully equal to France.
On the other hand there are those who say that France is greatly
convulsed in its interior; that the peasantry are suffering from the
failure of the harvest; that the strikes of the workingmen are every day
becoming more alarming; that political discontent has crept into the
army; and that Napoleon has no option but between the dangers of a
war and the dangers of a revolution."
Bancroft thus analyzed the situation in France—something that an ambas
sador accredited to one country does not normally do with respect to
another country. He concluded, "War is too great a danger for the Em
peror's dynasty." His prediction was wrong: war was declared. His
conclusion was correct: the war proved fatal to the Second Empire.
In assessing the responsibility for the war, Bancroft felt that Prussia had
tried to avoid a war. The French Emperor was the culprit. On July 12, 1870,
he reported to the State Department:
Napoleon demands of the King of Prussia that he [Prince Leopold]
shall not be admitted to a place on the list of candidates for the
Spanish throne, and couples his demand with a gross menace of
war. . . . Grave as the affair appears a war will be avoided unless the
Emperor of France and his ministers are resolved at all hazards to
make war on North Germany.'2
The final, "saving" clause of course covered Bancroft, but the weight of his
prediction was that war was not imminent. Further, to prove his view of
France's guilt, Bancroft on July 23 (after war had been declared) still argued
to the State Department that Leopold's candidature was not a threat to
France. He claimed that Napoleon was more closely related to Leopold than
Wilhelm was.
"#11I, ibid.
"#110, ibid.
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Bancroft exonerated King Wilhelm from any active participation in pro
voking the war. He reported an account to the State Department to prove
that the King was a model of correct behavior at Ems. He wrote:
One of my colleagues, who was at Ems during the whole time that
Benedetti was there, assures me that nothing could have been more
gentle and forbearing and polite than the conduct of the aged King
towards him.'^
In the next, dispatch, Bancroft also argued that the King had acted properly
in not forbidding Leopold's acceptance of the Spanish throne. He ex
plained—even while the war was already raging—that the Prussian king had
ordered an examination of the family archives to see if he had a right to
prohibit Leopold's acceptance of the throne. This investigation revealed that
the king "had no such right; he therefore could not forbid the Prince from
the career of adventure."'** In this same dispatch, Bancroft also blamed
Leopold for being too ambitious. He was the only German whom Bancroft
considered to have done wrong.
Though convinced that the French Emperor was responsible for the war,
Bancroft tried to excuse the people of France. On August 6, 1870, he
reported talking with some of the French prisoners of war:
The discontent with the war and the discontent with their Emperor
were more openly expressed than I could have believed. Some of them
insisted that more than one half of the army had voted against
the Plebiscite [which brought Napoleon III to power]. This is an ex
aggeration, but in substance confirms the opinion which I had formed—
that the French army is in some degree demoralized and weary of the
Emperor . . . the war exceedingly unpopular in France . . . the
tumult of excitement at the outbreak of war was superficial and in part
created by Government influence.
In a letter to Fish, he characterized the Second Empire as that "corrupting,
wasteful, and immoral government of Louis Napoleon."'^ In a letter to
Washburne on September 13, he rejoiced in the downfall of the Emperor:
I judged Napoleon justly twenty four years ago; and have never
'3# 115, ibid.
'*•#116, ibid.
'5# 123, ibid.
'^Letter to Fish, November 21, 1870, in M. A. De Wolfe Howe, The Life and
Letters of George Bancroft, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908),
11:247.
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wavered in my opinion of him. He has done France infinite evil; his
defeat and captivity came like a thunderbolt from Heaven.'^
In his private correspondence, Bancroft emotionally described Napoleon's
defeat and capture at Sedan:
The old contest between evil and good; and the victory at Marathon,
and on the plains of Abraham on the side of civilisation and freedom.
A people in arms crushes the degenerate hosts of despotism; and this
restless spirit of mischief [that] has had its abode in the Tuileries is at
last to be exorcised.
Thus, even when he talked with the captured Emperor in September 1870, he
hesitated to believe what Louis Napoleon declared.
The Emperor said that he lamented the calamity of the war and
declared that he himself had not wished for war, but had been com
pelled to it by the pressure of the public opinion of France."
In a postscript to his report, Bancroft in Berlin gave his own assessment of
the French political situation so that Washington would not be swayed by
the report about what the Emperor had said:
The great majority of the [French] rural population not only did not
desire war: they were greatly dissatisfied that it was declared.20
At the consular office in Berlin was the German-born Hermann Kreismann,
a friend of Elihu Benjamin Washburne. Born in Schwarzburg, Germany,
Kreismann held allegiance to the United States, according to the consular
record. Before his official mission abroad, he lived in Chicago, Illinois, and
helped Washburne add the German-American vote to the Republicans—
particularly during the 1860 election. He was appointed secretary of the
United States Legation to Berlin in August, 1861, and consul on December 18,
1865. He served in that office until June, 1874, when he was promoted to
Consul General, remaining in Berlin until August, 1881.
Kreismann was aware that reporting on the political developments within
Prussia was not his job. But in his reports he touched upon the events and
their consequences. Since he was concerned with commerce and trade, one
'^Ibid. 11:240.
'^Letter to Mrs. J. C. Bancroft Davis, September 4, 1870, ibid., pp. 235-6.
"Despatches - Germany, #134.
2oibid.
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of his contributions was his analysis of how the war would and did affect
American business. In a report on July 18, he reported the shock of the
"great financial and commercial convulsion" and his dismay of what would
happen to the many orders that had recently been placed by American
merchants. He predicted the close of the ports of Hamburg and Bremen and
felt that this would be detrimental because it would stop direct commu
nication between the United States and Germany. The most urgent problem
was the twelve per cent decline of the price of United States bonds. He joined
with Bancroft in urging Washington to ensure American credit abroad. He
ended the dispatch with a brief account of the German popular opinion
toward the war. The people "go into war with ardor and enthusiasm . . .
believing them to be in the right, war having been wantonly forced upon
them."2' Kreismann offered the wish that Germany would be victorious.
Though Kreismann had thought that the war would dislocate trade and
commerce, he discovered in actuality that trade had improved. The American
bonds rose, and the exports to the United States were good because of open
ports in Belgium and the Netherlands. In early September, he wrote,
"Business is generally reviving, the export of goods to the United States active,
and the money market easy and buoyant."22 This was the general trend he
reported throughout the coming months.
Another observation that Kreismann made was about whether the Franco-
Prussian war would evolve into a general European conflict. According to his
assessment, if Germany lost a major battle, Denmark would probably enter
the war on the French side. Italy and Austria, already leaning toward France,
would side with her, and Russia would side with Germany. This assessment of
the nature of the war contrasted to some extent with Washburne's in dispatch
246 which reported that "many intelligent and informed persons" felt the war
would not be localized but that he disagreed and believed that the countries
not yet involved would maintain their neutrality.
Thus, the messages to the State Department from the Berlin legation and
consulate fostered the view of Prussia (and particularly Wilhelm) as a victim
of a hostile French imperial policy. Consequently, the American
representatives expressed hopes for a German victory because right was on
their side.
2'#1I5, U.S., Department of State, Despatches from U.S. Consuls in Berlin, 1865-
1906, Microcopy T163, Roll 3.
22# 120, ibid.
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HL Bancroft, Bismarck And
The New German Reich
As we have seen, Bancroft interpreted events in a light favorable to
Prussia. He remained in character when he reported and analyzed the secret
draft treaty Count Benedetti had proposed in 1866and which was published
in the London Times shortly after the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian
War.' In this instance as well as in his dispatches reporting the progress
toward the unification of Germany and in his advice against American
mediation, Bancroft promoted the cause of Prussia.
Count Benedetti, the French ambassador, had submitted a handwritten
proposal to Bismarck offering French approval of German unity in ex
change for territorial concessions from Prussia (including the right to annex
or purchase the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Belgium). In this manner
Napoleon III had hoped that France could gain something to counter
balance the growing power and prestige of Prussia which had just success
fully concluded a war with Austria. The deal was refused by Prussia but
Bismarck kept a copy of the French proposal and used it after the declara
tion of war by France four years later.
Through his representatives in England, Bismarck was responsible for the
publication of the secret draft treaty in the London Times on July 25, 1870.
He had a dual aim: to ensure that England would not give aid to France and
to arouse antipathy toward France in the southern German states so they
would be more amenable to the creation of a united Germany. Bismarck was
successful. Great Britain became alarmed over the French interest in Bel
gium and the Netherlands because the independence of these countries on
the coast of the English Channel was of strategic importance to Great
Britain. Although the Times provided the correct treaty date (August, 1866),
the accompanying editorial comment implied that the treaty had been
offered again to Prussia more recently. The English, suspicious of France
and Napoleon III for a decade, believed the editorial despite denials by the
French government. On July 28, the issue was debated in the House of
Commons, and on July 30 the Cabinet proposed new treaties to France and
to Prussia. The treaties provided that Great Britain would defend Belgium if
her neutrality were violated by either belligerent. Prussia signed on August 9,
and France signed two days later.
' Information about the secret draft treaty in this chapter is from Dora Neill Raymond,
British Policy and Opinion during the Franco-Prussian War (New York: Columbia
University, 1921).
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The American State Department learned of the publication of the treaty
through its official representatives in the European capitals. There was a
notable difference in the manner and length of the reports from Pans and
Berlin. Washburne acted as a transmitter of information and offered little
analysis about the proposal or its publication. He sent copies of reports from
the French journals and commented that the incident had caused "great
sensation in the diplomatic and other circles of Paris."2 He let the newspaper
accounts stand without comment.
Washburne at this point in the war was, as we have seen, extremely busy
trying to protect the German citizens and negotiating with the French
government for their safe passage back to Germany. Thus he felt that he
lacked time to examine or try to ascertain the authenticity or significance of
the Benedetti draft treaty. But Washburne's lack of interpretation was also
typical of his unprofessional style of diplomatic behavior—to report on
events as they happened and let Washington deduce any significance from
the reports.
In Berlin, more attention and analysis—but also more passionate feel
ing—was devoted to the publication. Bancroft interpreted the Benedetti
proposal as a dastardly deed of the French. On July 27, he assured Secretary
of State Hamilton Fish of the authenticity of the document. Although
Bancroft perceived that the treaty was directed against Great Britain, he
misunderstood the underlying motive for the publication. He only saw the
French as schemers who were capable of offending and threatening not only
Prussia but also Great Britain. He wrote:
To-day I have to send you an authentic copy of one of the most
remarkable documents ever framed by a European statesman. . .
You may rely implicitly on the authenticity of the document of which 1
inclose a copy, for I have seen the original, in the handwriting of
Benedetti, which handwriting is very well known to me. As an ex
pression of contempt for the restraints of international law, the docu
ment may rank with the late declaration of war by the Emperor against
Prussia; but it has, moreover, the character of a defiance of Great
Britain.2
What is remarkable is that Bancroft was shown the original Benedetti treaty
so that he could pronounce on its authenticity. Bismarck knew the value of
having an official representative of a neutral country proclaim that Benedetti
had indeed written the document.
Although Bancroft had vouched for the document's authenticity, the State
^Washburne to Fish, July 29, 1870, Foreign Relations. 1870, p. 84.
JJbid., pp. 198-9.
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Department requested further information. The acting Secretary, J. C. B.
Davis, instructed Bancroft on August 23, 1870, to find out when the
Benedetti proposal had been made and why there had been a delay in
revealing the contents of the draft treaty. On December 17, Bancroft
answered the questions posed to him four months before. He gave a lengthy
explanation of the designs of Louis Napoleon:
Napoleon had expected Prussia and Austria would exhaust themselves
in the campaign of 1866 and leave him the umpire of Europe. He was
taken by surprise by the swift success of Prussia. He still hoped to
secure to himself acquisitions of territory as a condition to his assent to
the peace. . . The Emperor demanded, first, a retrocession of the
territory of Prussia held under the treaty of 1815. . . . Secondly, the
Emperor demanded that Luxemburg should never again be included in
the German Union. . . . Here then, is the answer to your first question:
The time when Mr. Benedetti delivered to Count Bismarck the project
of the treaty for the surrender of Belgium to France was during the
agitation of the Luxemburg question, perhaps in April, 1867.''
More interesting was the reasoning that Bancroft gave for the delay of
publication. Bismarck was pictured as the stalwart hero—defending the
rights of territory of Germans and ensuring peace:
He [Bismarck] did not, indeed, publish the proposition of France, for
it might have brought on a war, which he strove to avoid, and the
treaty was published only when war had come. . . . The advantage
proposed to Prussia for betraying Belgium into the hands of France
was the consent of France to coercing the southern states into the
North German Union. In the circular of the 7th of September, 1867,
Count Bismarck said . . . never, under any circumstances whatever,
would North Germany coerce the southern German states, or any of
them to join the North German Union, being resolved to wait till they
themselves should ask to be received. . . . Count Bismarck first main
tained that not a bit of German territory should be ceded; and when it
was proposed that France would take Belgium, and North Germany
South Germany, he rejected the offer and asserted with energy that no
foreign power whatsoever, not even Austria, had any right to interfere
with the union of North and South Germany; that it was a question for
the German states to settle exclusively among themselves.'
* Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1871 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1871), p. 361. Hereafter cited as Foreign Relations,
1871.
'Ibid.
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George Bancroft, the historian, imbued his history with the belief that
there was a divine plan for eventual world unity and freedom. He firmly
believed in the progress of man, democratic liberalism, and nationalism. In
Volume VI of his History, Bancroft developed a relationship between Ger
man liberalism and the rise of freedom in the United States. It is not
surprising, then, that he viewed Bismarck and the Prussian bid for unifica
tion as a parallel of the union of the American colonies a century earlier. In
writing to Washington in September, 1867, he declared that "but for the
triumph of the union in America, it could not have succeeded in North
Germany."^
Bancroft's dispatches and letters show him as genuinely believing that the
emerging Prussian-dominated Germany would institute liberal reforms and
would be based on the American example of constitution and government.
On August 2, 1870, in assessing Prussia's war aims, he wrote that the
German military were involved "in a war not only for peace, independence
and union of Germany but also for the best interests of civilization, of civil
and religious liberty and of popular freedom."'
In order to provide time for Germany to achieve these ends, Bancroft
promoted non-interference in the Franco-Prussian War. When on Septem
ber 8, Jules Favre, the French Foreign Minister, asked Grant to join with
other powers in mediation, Bancroft convinced Fish and Grant to refrain
from action. He felt that Germany and France should be left to settle matters
alone. He cabled; "Every other power holds back. America would stand
alone and unable to accomplish anything. Our interest, dignity, requires us
for the present to stand aloof."® In two longer dispatches Bancroft explained
more fully why he felt the United States should not mediate: no other power
had offered their services as mediator; France had declared war without
consultation with other governments, so France should seek peace in the
same way; and since Alsace and Lorraine would be a condition of the peace
and France would always be dissatisfied with this cession, the United States
would best refrain from active participation.^ It is to these reasons that Fish
referred when he acknowledged Bancroft's influence in determining the
American position on mediation in a dispatch to him in the end of Septem
ber. "The reasons which you present against an American intervention
between France and Germany are substantially among the considerations
which determined the President in the course and policy [of rejecting medi
ation.]"'® When France renewed its request for American influence in Octo
ber, the United States declined to act.
^Nye, Bancroft, p. 249.
'Despatches - Germany, #121.
^Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 206.
'Despatches - Germany, #132; #133.
Foreign Relations. 1870, p. 194.
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In counseling the United States to refrain from mediation, Bancroft
strengthened the traditional stance of American non-interference in
European affairs. But, this had not been his main intention: he had wanted
to give Germany time to defeat France. A victory for Bismarck could
consolidate the unification of Germany, something that he saw as a step
forward in the progress of civilization.
Bancroft's admiration of Prussia and his American patriotism explain his
interpretation of the creation of the German Reich as a liberal reform. To
him the elements which demonstrated the liberal tendencies of Germany
were universal suffrage, the parliamentary constitution, and the federal
system of government—all of which he took at face value as furthering the
rights of individuals. He felt that Prussia exhibited the finest democratic
principles in all of Europe. He wrote: "According to our American ideas of
Republicanism there is more solid, substantial, law-respecting, enduring
republicanism in Germany than in any other State of Europe, not excepting
England."" He did not see any inconsistency between this republicanism and
the later coronation of the King of Prussia as Emperor because the German
union was federal, had representative institutions, and had obtained the
approval of both the governments and the people of the separate German
states. In April, 1871, Bancroft wrote: "The German Diet maintains its
liberal character. It has a clear majority in favor of a liberal policy."'^
In his analysis of the "liberal" constitution, Bancroft overlooked the
superficiality of Bismarck's liberalism. While noting the provisions, he failed
to understand why they were included and neglected to see what was
missing. The constitution itself had been drafted under Bismarck's direction
and was not a product of a convention. There was no guarantee of civil
rights. The universal suffrage for the election of members to the Reichstag
did not favor the liberal urban population because the bulk of the voters
were the conservative peasantry. By not providing payment for the Reichs
tag members, the constitution ensured the exclusion of the growing working
class (and much of the middle class) who could not afford to work without a
salary. In the Bundesrat, Prussia maintained her strength by retaining enough
votes to block any attempt to amend the constitution. While the Reichstag
had limited powers, the imperial chancellor—with no responsibility to the
parliament—was in charge of policy. Effectively, Prussia dominated the
federation, and the chancellor dominated Prussia.
Bancroft believed that the underlying affinity between Germany and the
United States naturally produced Germany's imitation of America's ex
ample. He explained this view in a letter to Fish in October, 1870:
Our foreign political interests almost always run parallel with those of
"Despatches - Germany, #152.
"Ibid., #213.
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Germany, and are often in direct conflict with those of France. . .
Germany adopts from us the federative system; France, whether em
pire, monarchy, or republic, adheres to the system of centraliza
tion. . . If we need solid, trusty good will of any government in Europe,
we can have it best with Germany; because German institutions and ours
most nearly resemble each other; and because so many millions of
Germans have become our countrymen. This war will leave Germany
the most powerful state in Europe, and the most free; its friendship is,
therefore, most important to us; and has its foundations in history and
in nature.'3
In early November, Bancroft compared Bavaria's reluctance to join a
German union to the situation in 1789 when North Carolina delayed entry
into the American Union. But Bancroft accurately predicted that Bavaria
would hold out for only a short while. On November 29, 1870, Bancroft
reported that the treaties of union had been completed and rejoiced that, as
he saw it, America was the parent to the German confederation. America's
development provided the model for Germany. He wrote: "In one sense the
new government is the child of America; but for our success in our civil war
it would not have been established. Our victory in that strife sowed the seeds
of the regeneration of Europe."'"
A week later, Bancroft reported that many European journals feared the
development of a despotic Germany. He dismissed these fears with an
affirmation of belief in the rulers of Germany. He further stated that he
believed that "the union of Germany means the freedom of Germany ex
ternal and internal, its independence as a Cosmopolitan power, its natural
development and progress in internal freedom."'^
On January 18, 1871, King Wilhelm of Prussia received the title of
Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. The news was telegraphed to
Berlin where the Proclamation of the German Reich was published. Upon
learning of the creation of the German Reich, Bancroft wrote to Washington
strongly emphasizing the similarities between the United States and German
governments.
This union cannot but especially touch the sympathies of the United
States partly because it is in so many respects a copy of our own
union. . . .
United America may see in United Germany a reproduction of its
own constitution with such modifications as the history and condition
of Germany seemed to require . . .
''Howe, Bancroft, 11:246-7.
^^Foreign Relations, 1871, p. 359.
"Despatches - Germany, #168.
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Its constitution in another respect resemble our own; it imparts
exceeding strength for the purposes of self-defense and takes from its
chief the power of entering upon wars of conquest and ambition.
Bancroft thus welcomed the empire, a form of government he had de
nounced in France. His admiration for Germany outweighed his dislike of
empires.
Bancroft, mesmerized by his Prussophilism, was an asset to the Iron
Chancellor. He authenticated the Benedetti draft treaty whose publication
had guaranteed a strict British neutrality. He then by his arguments against
American mediation lessened Bismarck's fear of neutrals banding together
to force moderate peace demands. Finally, he interpreted each step in the
development of a unified Germany (activation of the southern military
alliances, the November treaties, the proclamation of the Reich, the election
and sessions of the new parliamentary houses) in a way that evoked sympathy
in Washington.
"ftJbid., #181.
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IV. Washburne And The
Siege of Paris
Life in Paris during the Franco-Prussian War presented many difficulties
for the American representatives. There was confusion in the capital as
governments collapsed or were challenged and new ones set up. Washburne
reported on the changes of ministry and type of government, but his dis
patches were brief and relayed facts with little political evaluation. For
example, he provided a lengthy narrative of his observation of the Corps
legislatif following the news of the surrender at Sedan. He noticed the
confusion, the fraternization of the people and the National Guard, and the
popular enthusiasm for the proclamation of the republic. Nevertheless, he
concluded the dispatch with a comment oh the weather and his reaction to
the events of the day:
The day had been pleasant and the night was beautiful beyond descrip
tion . . . in a few brief hours of a Sabbath day I had seen a dynasty fall
and a republic proclaimed, and all without the shedding of one drop of
blood.'
Two months later he commented on the abortive uprising of the Commune
of October 31. He dismissed it as a "little side show" which was at once
"outstanding and ludicrous.'" Little did he realize that the dissatisfaction
displayed by some radical leaders would be repeated as a major political
upheaval in March with the establishment of the Paris Commune.
While political developments in France were not the primary topic of the
dispatches received by the State Department, Washburne's reports shed
interesting light on the problems of living in a besieged city. Being the
protectors of the enemy's citizens did not make the American representatives
popular with the Parisians, who were losing the war. Further, rumors
abounded that the United States was a partisan of Germany or of France.
In accord with international law and her own neutrality proclamation, the
United States permitted private industry to sell arms and ammunition as
long as these persons did not "carry such articles upon the high seas for the
use or service of either belligerent." If such person did transport the war
material, they were liable to "the risk of hostile capture, and the penalties
denounced by the law of nations in that behalf."^
^Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 115.
^Despatches - France, #314.
^Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 47.
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There were varied rumors that the United States was not abiding by her
own rules. In early August, Washburne reported that Bancroft had re
quested him to investigate reports of an American in Paris ordering guns
ostensibly for the United States but in reality for the French. It also seemed
that Washburne's name was used to purchase cartridges in Belgium allegedly
for Peru but actually for the French. Washburne was angry that his name
was being sullied, and he reported that he was trying to locate "the scoundrel
who had proposed to involve me in a matter of such gravity . . . . a gross
and unpardonable outrage."'* The investigation came to nothing, however,
since Washburne could find no reliable information to prove that the U.S. or
he himself had been involved.
Of more serious consequence were 400,000 rifles and ammunition which
were sold and shipped to France from the United states. These guns were
stamped "U.S. Government" and came from American arsenals. Grant
discontinued these sales when it was discovered that the customers were
agents of the French government. In July and September, Bancroft ques
tioned the State Department about American provision of war material to
France. Fish responded, "In no case has a sale been made to any person
known or suspected [as] an agent of either belligerent."^ Bismarck did not
charge the United States with a breach of neutrality when she sold the war
material to an agent of the French government. According to one historian,
Bismarck listened to the advice of Bancroft in choosing not to take official
action as he had done in cases of similar British violations.^ Bismarck,
preferring to maintain cordial relations with the Americans, chose to overlook
apparent—and probably unintentional—American violations of neutrality.
When the news of the French army's defeat and the Emperor's surrender
reached Paris, it caused the overthrow of the regime and proclamation of a
republic. On September 5, an announcement was made: "Citizens of Paris,
the Republic is proclaimed. The Government has been named by acclama
tion. . . . The Government is, above all, a Government of National De
fense." Washburne informed the State Department of these events and
requested instructions. Acting Secretary of State Davis telegraphed: "As
soon as situation in your judgment shall justify, tender the congratulations
of President and people of United States on the successful establishment of
republican government."' Washburne conveyed U.S. recognition of the
new government on September 7. In the letter to Jules Favre, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, he emphasized the pleasure of the United States in recog
nizing a republic. He wrote:
''Despatches - France, #243.
'Richard Carlton Rohrs, "George Bancroft and American Foreign Relations" (Ph.D.
dissertation. University of Nebraska, Lincoln, 1976), p. 197.
^Stolberg-Wernigerode, p. 129.
''Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 67.
26
I beg to tender to yourself and the members of the Government of the
National Defense the felicitations of the Government and the people of
the United States. . . . Enjoying the untold and immeasurable bless
ings of a republican form of government for nearly a century, the
people of the United States can but regard with profoundest interest
the efforts of the French people to whom they are bound by the ties of
a traditional friendship, to obtain such free institutions as will become
to them and to their posterity the inalienable rights of "life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness."®
The establishment of this new republican government produced a change
of attitude in America toward France and Germany. Whereas in the sum
mer, Americans had favored Germany in the belief that she was fighting a
war both of self-defense and for national unity, by October the creation of a
French republic and the hardship that France endured with such courage
increased the sympathy of the American people toward France.
Of course, this new sentiment grew slowly over a period of several months.
One important factor influencing the American attitude was the siege of
Paris which lasted over four months. On September 20, Washburne re
ported: "All communication with Paris was cut yesterday morning, both by
rail and by telegraph."' Most members of the new French government and of
the diplomatic corps moved to Tours to carry on their work, Washburne, by
his own testimony, was "the only minister of a first-class power who re
mained."'" In November, the State Department gave Washburne and John
Meredith Read, the U.S. Consul General, permission to leave the besieged
capital, but both remained." They considered it their duty to stay in Paris,
the traditional capital of France, to protect one hundred and fifty Americans
who chose not to leave in October and to watch over American property
(especially of those Americans who departed). Valiantly and perseveringly,
Washburne performed his duty throughout the siege, even when facing
unique problems. He continued to protect the German citizens," and re
sponded with determination when American rights were threatened.
®lbid., p. 117. The United States was the first nation to recognize the new French
government.
^Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 121.
^^Recollections, 1:72-73. Five ministers in addition to Washburne remained in Paris.
They were the representatives from Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and
Switzerland. Hoffman, p. 174.
"On the other hand, during the Commune (March 18-May 27, 1871), Washburne
left Paris and stayed at Versailles.
"By this time the United States was the official protector of the citizens of Saxony,
Hesse, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Colombia, Portugal, Uruguay, the Dominican Repub
lic, Ecuador, Chile, Paraguay, and Venezuela, in addition to those of the North
German Confederation.
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When the siege began, three hundred American citizens were in Paris.
Washburne worried about their fate, because he doubted that the French
and Prussian authorities would allow them to leave Paris. On October 18,
Jules Favre had informed Washburne, "Permission to leave Paris during the
siege can only be granted to persons clothed with a diplomatic character."
A week later, on October 24, this provision was reversed. Washburne wrote
to the State Department, "They [General Trochu and Jules Favre] finally
agreed to change their determination, and let all of our Americans go who
wanted to leave."'** About half the Americans in Paris chose to depart, while
the other one hundred fifty remained. With the achievement of this con
cession, Washburne's daily duties subsequently involved providing small
sums of money for the indigent Germans, preparing dispatches, awaiting his
dispatch bags (his link with the outside world), and occupying himself with
other diplomatic activities.
During the siege, the amount and type of work at the Legation changed.
No longer was there the urgency to provide safe conducts and transportation
for nearly 30,000 Germans. It was this change in urgent business and the
isolation from the outside world which played their parts in the psycho
logical impact on the Americans. Washburne kept a diary during the siege
which recorded the privations which accompanied his remaining in Paris For
the first month, the effect was minimal, but by November Washburne began
to record prices of food—indicating that the prices were unusual and food
less available. Expenses soared in the following months, and the quality and
variety of foodstuffs diminished. Near the end of the siege, the rationing of
bread began. This was indicative of the grim conditions in Paris because the
government had continually asserted that there was enough food, and that
bread would not have to be rationed. Fuel became a problem when the
winter cold hit Paris. Although Washburne did not suffer from a lack of fuel
he commented on the scarcity of wood in his diary.
In contrast to the somber and gloomy comments of Washburne the
secretary of the Legation seemed to enjoy the siege—if his memoirs can be
accepted literally. Hoffman recounted that the experience of the siege was
"not an unpleasant one, especially in a city like Paris." One reason was his
curiosity: "I had been a besieger at Port Hudson, and thought that I would
like to experience the other sensation." Another was the fact that the siee
brought relief from being "overworked and harrassed. . . . You live quietlv
in your own house, and with your own servants; and with a little forethought
you may be amply provisioned."'' He recalled that money could always
obtain enough food, though not fuel, which had been seized by the govern
ment.
Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 130.
''•Ibid., p. 131.
"Hoffman, p. 181.
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While the physical privations of the Legation were not great, the Americans
nevertheless suffered the psychological impact of the siege—the sense of
isolation, anxiety, and gloom. The lack of communication with the outside
world (a little news was flown in by carrier-pigeon!) produced unrest and
disquiet. When the news came of a French defeat, the crowds gathered and
disturbances broke out. In the end of October, there was an unsuccessful
attempt to overthrow the Government of National Defense. General Trochu
in Paris planned sorties in December and in January, but both failed.
Washburne observed all these developments and recorded his growing sym
pathy for the French.
Influencing Washburne was the Prussian policy of delaying his dispatch
bags and of bombarding Paris (about which Washburne was indignant
because he thought the diplomatic corps should have been informed before it
started). In his diary, he wrote;
If anything could dishearten and dicourage the French people, one
would have supposed it would have been the news that came this
morning, of the disasters at Orleans, Amiens and Rouen. But the
Parisians seemed to take it as a matter of course, and only wonder that
it was not worse. No signs of giving in. .
The carelessness and nonchalance of the Parisians in all this business
is wonderful. . . . Ladies and gentlemen now make excursions to the
Point du Jour to see the shells fall."
Although Washburne received regular communications from Washington
and London, his diary showed a growing sense of depression. He wondered
if he was doing any good in Paris, and he wrote about some of his previous
successful experiences. In January, 1871, he wrote:
Four months of siege to-day, and where has all this time gone: It seems
to me as if I had been buried alive. I have accomplished nothing, and,
separated from my family and friends, cut off from communication to
a certain extent with the outside world, these dreary weeks might quite
as well be struck out of my existence."^
It was no wonder then that Washburne valued his dispatch bags. He was
adamant in protecting his right to send them through enemy lines. From
early in the siege until after a French-German armistice was signed in the end
of January, Washburne concerned himself with different aspects of his right
to correspond with Washington. In September he joined the remaining
Recollections, 1:265.
"Ibid., p. 293.
'8Ibid., p. 317.
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members of the diplomatic corps in Paris in requesting permission of Bis
marck to send and receive communications with their home governments.
Bismarck offered a qualified permission: "Only on the condition that such
dispatches shall be unsealed and subject to the inspection of the Prussian
authorities and contain nothing in relation to the war."" Washburne reacted
indignantly because Bismarck was violating international law which allows
neutrals to communicate with their governments without submitting to
foreign inspection. Although previously Washburne had been hesitant to act
without express instructions from the State Department, he now rejected
Bismarck's terms out of hand.
Bismarck may have been surprised by the tone of Washburne's response,
since in Berlin his dealings with Americans had been through the Prusso-
phile Bancroft. Bismarck did not want to offend the Americans because he
felt success was obtainable only by keeping neutrals satisfied and out of the
conflict. Thus, he conceded to the Americans the privilege of sending and
receiving communications. Simultaneously, he made sure that Washburne
knew that the United States was being given preferential treatment. On the
same day, in a letter to Archbishop Flavio Chigi, the Papal Nuncio and
Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps in Paris, Bismarck denied the right of
uninspected communications to or from the diplomatic corps of Paris.
Although the right (according to the United States) or the privilege
(according to Bismarck) of sealed communication was established, a second
ary problem arose over the contents of the dispatch bags. In a dispatch to
Washburne, Bismarck redefined—in narrower terms—the permission he had
granted to the Americans by professing ignorance that the dispatch bags
would contain newspapers and other non-official communications.
Washburne protested Bismarck's implied accusation of American miscon
duct but announced he would accept only American papers for his personal
perusal and requested Bismarck's consent to this arrangement. (By "request-
ting", of course, he undermined his previous principled position on un
hampered communication.) Then Washburne assumed the offensive by
questioning the delays of his dispatch bags. "It ought not really to take more
than four or five days for the bag to come from London, here, and I wish
that hereafter I might receive it within this time."2o Bismarck attempted to
pacify Washburne by re-interpreting his original intentions. He wrote:
I only intended to call your attention to the abuse . . . convinced that
you were unaware of [it] . . . But I had no intention to deprive you
personally of the English or American papers which you wish to
Foreign Relations, 1870, p. 127.
^oibid, p. 284.
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receive, and you are entirely free to have them come for your own
private use.-'
Thus, Bismarck allowed newspapers to be sent to Washburne—again not as
a matter of right but as a concession. But Washburne in early January
amazingly asked that no more papers be sent to him because "it is too much
to be the only person in a city of two millions of people receiving any outside
news. I prefer being without news to being subject to it."22
In regard to private letters, a similar pattern took place in January:
Bismarck accusing Americans of abuse of the privilege, Washburne angrily
protesting American innocence, and Bismarck replying that he had been
misunderstood. In this instance Bismarck cited as evidence a captured
balloon which had implicated the American Legation in receiving and
delivering private correspondence. Bismarck's apology was sent on January
28, 1871—the day the armistice was signed between France and Germany.
He wrote:
I should very much regret if you should have construed anything in
these two letters so as to convey the indication of any complaint
against you. Nothing, indeed, could be further from my thought and I
take pleasure in renewing the expression how deeply sensible I am of
all the trouble you have in carrying on your correspondence with the
authorities in Paris, and in taking care of our countrymen there.23
Hamilton Fish was annoyed at the treatment Washburne was receiving at
the hands of the Prussians. In November, he supported Washburne's re
jection of the Prussian permission to allow unsealed bags to pass through the
Prussian lines and instructed Bancroft to propound America's position of
the right of communication with her representative in Paris. Bancroft was
not impressed with the American position on this neutral right. He followed
instructions, but the report of his conversation with the Prussian authorities
indicated that he had acted perfunctorily. He implied that the issue was not
important and that its practicality would disappear because the war would
soon end.
In Paris, Hoffman also disagreed with Washburne and Fish. As a lawyer
(but with no responsibility in this matter), he wrote in his memoirs that the
right to receive and answer dispatches in sealed correspondence was "by no
means clear. To me Bismarck's argument is unanswerable.''^-* By the last
2'Ibid., p. 284.
^^Recollections, I: 308.
Foreign Relations. 1871, p. 291.
2'*Hoffman, pp. 178-9.
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statement, Hoffman meant that since the diplomats were in Paris volun
tarily, they had no right to claim privileges.
In January Fish again telegraphed Bancroft to investigate and to remedy
the delays of communication which Washburne had been reporting. He
argued that since the United States was protecting the North German
citizens, there should be some reciprocal treatment. In Berlin, George
Bancroft could not believe that Germany was responsible for the delays. He
reported that the German officials denied knowledge of any delays.
For explanation of the interruption alluded to by you in the telegram, I
am left to a conjecture, aided by what has appeared in the public
journals. The French press in Paris complains bitterly that Mr.
Washburne alone received newspapers and communication from
abroad, and the complaint [is that the newspapers] give no account of
French victories. . . .
I will continue inquiry, and will not fail to make a proper repre
sentation to this government, should the grievance from which Mr.
Washburne suffers be found to proceed from the German side; but I
have no doubt that the difficulty has arisen in another quarter.^s
One reason for Bancroft's confidence in the virtue of the Germans was that
Bismarck had written to him on January 15, explaining the Prussian position
of the right of communication. Bismarck asserted, "As we have, in fact,
forwarded Mr. Washburne's dispatches both ways, the question has a
theoretical significance only."26 Bancroft understood this statement to mean
that there had been no delays. In a letter to Fish, he implied that Washburne
might be mistaken about the delays. His dispatches must be reaching him.
He wrote:
My own letters to him appear to have reached him regularly except on
one single occasion. The note of Count Bismarck, of January 15, which
I lately forwarded to you, states unequivocally that Mr. Washburne's
intercourse with the Government is free and uninterrupted. I have
heard of no delay but on one occasion; but the unvarying declarations
of this government from all its departments preclude the idea that the
delay was intentional on their part.^'
Thus, in this instance, too, Bismarck had not only a friend in Bancroft but
also an advocate who argued persuasively on Germany's behalf.
Foreign Relations, 1871, pp. 371-2.
^''Ibid., p. 372.
2'Ibid., pp. 374-5.
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Fish corrected Bancroft on February 24, and told him that Bismarck
himself had admitted delaying the dispatch bags. Bancroft's reaction to this
information is unknown because Fish ended the instruction with, "There
does not appear to be any necessity for continuing the discussion."28
28Ibid., p. 377.
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During the Franco-Prussian War the United States could hardly have
been represented in Paris and Berlin by two more dissimilar diplomats, who
conceived of their missions in wholly contrasting fashions, and who saw
historic developments with very different eyes.
Elihu Benjamin Washburne, American minister to France, concentrated
on his protective tasks and neglected his political duties. In his official
dispatches, Washburne did not discuss the causes of the war and refrained
from analyzing political or military events in the French capital. But he
detailed records of his protective services for the citizens of the North
German Confederation: he moderated the French expulsion of German
citizens by engaging in legal sparring with the French foreign minister; he
issued and certified passports to 30,000 persons, procured railroad tickets for
9,500 Germans and distributed small sums to 20,000 destitute people.
Though the humanitarian instinct was present in his protection of German
citizens, Washburne undertook the job because it was assigned to him. He
was a conscientious man who took pride in doing a job well. He also
staunchly supported American neutral rights. With consistent determina
tion, he postulated the American interpretation of the rights of neutral
citizens to communicate with their own governments even during a siege.
But in the momentous events through which he lived, he lacked the back
ground, experience, training and personal qualities that could have enabled
him to help the United States Government to understand, in a broader
context, what was happening.
On the other hand, George Bancroft, American minister in Berlin, gave his
first attention to political analysis. The State Department benefited from this
approach, even though it had to temper Bancroft's enthusiasm a few times.
His effect on the formulation of American policy can be seen when Fish used
Bancroft's arguments for the American refusal to intervene diplomatically
and when Grant employed Bancroft's words and phrases to describe the new
German government and constitution.
The problem with Bancroft did not lie in the intellectual quality of his
reporting but rather in his one-sided attitude. He certainly possessed an
unusually broad background as a historian, but as a diplomat—who is
supposed to think in terms of the national interest—his views tended to be
simplistic. His excessive admiration of Bismarck and Prussia colored his
perceptions, so that essentially he argued the Prussian cause incessantly.
This might have been less of a problem if his reporting, analyses and policy
recommendations had been counterbalanced by the American legation in
Paris.
The background of the two ministers, their lack of diplomatic experience,
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as well as their individual personalities and abilities, account for the different
ways in which they approached their assignments. Washburne was a legal-
minded, financially cautious politician who had been given an "easy" appoint
ment as a reward for his faithful and long service in Congress and for his
help in promoting the military career of Ulysses S. Grant. Bancroft was a
noted historian who had been educated in Germany, who saw his democratic
ideals being enacted in the unification of Germany under Bismarck.
Washburne was a friend of Napoleon III, and he admired him. Before the
war broke out, he believed that the French Emperor was seeking a liberal,
constitutionally limited government. Afterward, Washburne welcomed the
new republic but did not give Washington any in-depth discussion of the
men in the government—what were their views and perspectives, or what
effect they would have either in France or on the course of the war. Bancroft,
friend of Bismarck, pleaded on behalf of Prussia and the German Reich. He
enthusiastically drew parallels between German unification and American
federalism while consistently ignoring their important differences. Bancroft's
biased information was based on his profound belief in liberalism and
idealism, but he was also subject to manipulation by Bismarck.
Other Americans in Paris and Berlin did not compensate for the weak
nesses of Washburne and Bancroft. In Paris, Hoffman, the secretary to the
American legation and charge' d'affaires in July, 1870, did report on the
deeper causes of the war. He recognized that the Franco-Prussian antagonism
had roots in the 1860s with the rise of Bismarck and Prussia as a potential
challenge to France's power. But the cost-consciousness of Washburne, the
"Watchdog of the Treasury", contributed to the deplorable decision of
Hoffman as charge' to send reports about the Parisian response to Leopold's
candidacy by regular mail rather than by cable. Moreover, once Washburne
returned from Carlsbad in July, 1870, the Paris dispatches became again
simple chronicles of events in Paris rather than an assessment of why or how
events happened. There is no evidence that Washburne systematically de
veloped contacts in and outside of the governments and that he attempted to
gather the kind of information that would have allowed him to send reasoned
assessments to Washington.
The two consuls. Read in Paris and Kreismann in Berlin, did not add to
the State Department's understanding of what was happening. Read ap
parently did not want to infringe upon the Legation's functions, jealously
guarded by Washburne. Kreismann provided auxiliary information
(especially on the war's effect on the import and export trade) but did not
influence or counterbalance Bancroft's picture of a nascent German
democracy threatened by an aggressive, evil France. His admiration for
Bancroft and his own German heritage did not make him an impartial
observer of the Franco-Prussian War.
Thus, the two ministers served Washington inadequately in very different
ways. Washburne, the run-of-the-mine politician with no special diplomatic
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training or insight, was a methodical and conscientious worker, but not a
perceptive commentator. He rarely wrote of political events, and when he
did, he perpetuated the stereotype of an imperial, aggressive France even
after the empire fell and the new provisional republic was attempting to
survive. Bancroft, the ardent champion of liberalism and democracy, enthu
siastically supported the Iron Chancellor without understanding that
Bismarck was basically neither a liberal nor a democrat, and that the new
German Reich was an authoritarian creation behind parliamentary window
dressing.
In short, from neither representative did Washington derive anything
approaching a clear picture of political developments. But because neither the
two capitals, nor the war, were vital for American interests in 1870 and 1871,
the diversity of perceptions of these two untrained diplomats wrought no real
harm.
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